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Comments
THE WAGE AND HOUR LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT
On February 3, 1941, the United States Supreme Court up-
held the federal "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938"1 in two deci-
sions: United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Company2 and Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of
Department of Labor.8 The action taken by the Supreme Court in
the Darby Lumber Company case 4 was not startling. In the Jones
1. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (Supp. 1940). See Comment
(1939) 52 Harr. L. Rev. 646.
2. 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 395 (1941), noted in (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 882.
3. 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 407 (1941).
4. 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 395 (1941). This case upheld the statute as against
the contention that it was beyond the scope of the federal authority granted




& Laughlin decision5 upholding the constitutionality of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 6 four years ago, the court made abun-
dantly clear that it would support the exercise of federal
authority under the Commerce power far beyond limits recognized
a decade ago. The Opp Cotton Mills case reaffirmed the freedom
of Congress to delegate the detailed administration of its regula-
tory laws within a statutory framework.8
The Jones & Laughlin case had come as something of a
surprise to the legal profession. Prior to the time that it was
decided, six United States District Courts, proceeding on the au-
thority of the A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United
States9 and Carter v. Carter Coal Company," had held that the
National Labor Relations Board had no authority to regulate
relations between employers and employees engaged in local pro-
duction, and these holdings had been affirmed on four occasions
by the Circuit Courts of Appeal.1
The decision that the activities of the Jones & Laughlin Cor-
poration of Pennsylvania had a substantial effect upon interstate
commerce would not necessarily be precedent for upholding the
Fair Labor Standards Act in such a case as the Darby Lumber
Company case. Jones & Laughlin was the fourth largest manufac-
turer of iron and steel products in the United States. Its assets
were more than one hundred and eighty million dollars; its gross
income forty-seven million dollars; its employees number twenty-
two thousand persons. It was the parent of nineteen subsidiaries
5. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352 (1937).
6. Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166 (Supp.
1940).
7. 61 S.Ct. 424, 85 L.Ed. 407 (1941). In this decision the statute successfully
met the challenges that it was contrary to basic "separation of powers"
theories and that it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative author-
ity to the executive department.
8. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct.
837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947 (1935), the Court stated: "But Congress can-
not delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered dis-
cretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the
rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry." (295 U.S. at 537-538, 55
S.Ct. at 846, 79 L.Ed. at 1584.) See also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936). However, ".... Congress may declare its
will, and after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon administrative officers
the 'power to fill up the details' by prescribing administrative rules and regu-
lations." United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85,
53 S.Ct. 42, 44, 77 L.Ed. 175, 179 (1932). See also United States v. Grimaud, 220
U.S. 506, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911).
9. 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947 (1935).
10. 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936).
11. See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 76-77, 79-84, 57 S.Ct. 615, 630-633, 81 L.Ed. 893, 924, 926-928 (1937).
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and maintained sales offices in twenty cities. Pointing out that
"the stoppage of those operations by industrial strife would have
a most serious effect upon interstate commerce," the Court said:
"In view of respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that
the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would
be immediate and might be catastrophic."'1 2 When the Jones &
Laughlin opinion was handed down, however, the gates were
open. Subsequent decisions rapidly extended its doctrine to sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
concerns whose operations had a less obvious effect on interstate
commerce."
The distinction between the problems of policy involved in
upholding the National Labor Relations Board and the problems
raised by the wage and hour law was well stated by Arthur A.
Ballantine in a speech reported in the American Bar Association
Journal in 1939. He said:
"In the cases sustaining the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board, the Court has pointed out that the busi-
nesses involved were sufficiently large so that a stoppage of
their operation by a strike would reduce substantially the
flow of interstate goods, but the Wage and Hour Law, by its
terms, applies to all employees engaged in the production of
goods for interstate commerce, even in plants so small that a
strike in them would produce an infinitesimal effect upon the
flow of goods."'14
The so-called "Wage and Hour Law" became effective on
October 24, 1938. The most far-reaching legislation of its kind
since the abortive National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,15 the
statute was conceived on the theory that any physical handling
of goods, destined for subsequent shipment across state lines, is
an act so closely and substantially related to the flow of inter-
12. 301 U.S. at 41, 57 S.Ct. at 626, 81 L.Ed. at 914.
13. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305
U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938), where there was no shipment across
state lines, but the company supplied electric energy to the City of New York
which was the focal point of railways, steamship lines, radio networks, tele-
graph companies, etc.; National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer
Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 S.Ct. 642, 81 L.Ed. 918 (1937), which involved the manu-
facture of trailers, where fifty per cent of the raw materials were obtained
out of state and eighty per cent of the finished products were shipped out of
state; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303
U.S. 453, 58 S.Ct. 656, 82 L.Ed. 954 (1938), when thirty-seven per cent of the
fruit packed was sent out of the state where grown and packed.
14. Ballantine, The Federal Power Over Interstate Commerce Today
(1939) 25 A.B.A.J. 252, 255.
15. 48 Stat. 195 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 701-712 (1939), approved June 16,
1933.
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state commerce as to be the subject of congressional regulation.16
The 1941 Supreme Court is unanimously in accord with this posi-
tion.
The act sets up a comprehensive legislative scheme to pre-
vent the shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced in
the United States under labor conditions which fail to conform to
minimum standards established by the statute. Its purpose is to
"provide for the establishment of fair labor standards in employ-
ments affecting interstate commerce"'17 by fixing a minimum
wage 8 and a maximum number of hours of work per week, 9 and
by prohibiting "oppressive child labor."20 To this end, a Wage
and Hour division under the direction of an Administrator is
16. The act states its own theory, as follows: "The Congress hereby finds
that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance
of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and gen-
eral well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instru-
mentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor
conditions among the workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce
and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of
competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstruct-
ing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes
with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce." 52 Stat. 1060
(1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 202 (Supp. 1940).
Section 3(b) defines "commerce" as "trade, commerce, transportation,
transmission, or communication among the several States or from any State
to any place outside thereof."
17. Preamble, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938). See 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 213 (Supp. 1940) for exemptions, e.g., the statute does not apply its wage
and hour provisions to seamen, agricultural employees, etc.
18. Section 6(a) fixes a 25 cents per hour minimum during the first year
after the effective date of the act, a 30 cents per hour minimum for the next
six years, and a 40 cents per hour minimum thereafter. The administrator is
given certain authority to mitigate the rigidity of the rate, within the limit
of 40 cents per hour. 52 Stat. 1062, 1064 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 206, 208 (Supp.
1940).
19. Section 7(a) provides a maximum "workweek" of 44 hours for the
first year, 42 hours for the second year, and a 40 hour week for subsequent
years. For work In excess of this maximum, the employee must receive "not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed."
52 Stat. 1063 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Supp. 1940).
Section 15(a) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person "(1) to
transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver or sell in commerce .... or
sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce
is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was em-
ployed in violation" of the wage and hour provisions of the statute "or in
violation of any order of the Administrator" regularly issued. 52 Stat. 1068
(1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 215 (Supp. 1940).
20. "Oppressive Child Labor" is extensively defined in Section 3(e), 52
Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1940). Generally, it excludes employ-
ment of children under the age of sixteen and employment of children over
the age of eighteen in occupations designated as "hazardous" or "detri-
mental" by the Chief of the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor.
The same officer has discretion to permit employment of children between the
ages of fourteen and sixteen in certain employments determined not to inter-
fere with the children's schooling, health and well-being. Section 12, 52 Stat.
COMMENTS
established in the Department of Labor, with power to effectuate
the provisions of the act.21 Criminal penalties sanction the
statute.
22
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 193322 had attempted
to accomplish, inter alia, the same three objectives sought in the
1938 act: namely, minimum wages, maximum hours, and aboli-
tion of child labor. In the Schechter case 24 that act was declared
unconstitutional on two grounds: (1) the fixing of the hours and
wages of employees engaged in intrastate activities was the exer-
cise of a power not delegated to Congress by the Constitution,
hence could not be accomplished by federal statute, and (2)
Section 3 of the act, authorizing the approval of codes of fair
competition, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the President in that it did not supply standards or pre-
scribe rules of conduct to be applied to the particular states of
fact determined by administrative procedure.
Three months after the Schechter opinion, 25 the President ap-
proved the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935'2 which
provided among other things that wages and hours agreed upon
by producers of more than two-thirds of the annual tonnage pro-
duction and representatives of more than one-half of the mine
workers should be accepted by all code members. Again, in Carter
v. Carter Coal Company2  the Supreme Court held that such pro-
visions constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority
and an attempt to regulate local productive activity not forming
a part of the stream of interstate commerce. It seemed well
settled that "production is not commerce. ' 28
1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 212 (Supp. 1940), forbids shipment in interstate
commerce of all goods from any establishment "in or about which within 30
days prior to the removal of such goods therefrom any oppressive child labor
has been employed."
21. Sections 4, 8, 11, 52 Stat. 1061, 1064, 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 204, 208,
211 (Supp. 1940). It is unlawful to violate orders of the Administrator. Section
15(a)(1), 52 Stat. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 215 (Supp. 1940).
22. Section 16 provides a maximum fine of $10,000 and/or a maximum
imprisonment for six months for violation of certain specified acts prohibited
by Section 15.
23. 48 Stat. 195 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 701-712 (1939), approved June 16,
1933.
24. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct.
837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947 (1935).
25. Ibid.
26. 49 Stat. 991 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. 801-827 (1939), approved August 30, 1935.
27. 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936).
28. "No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly
expressed in economic and political literature, than that between manufac-
tures and commerce." Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20, 9 S.Ct. 6, 10, 32 L.Ed.
346, 350 (1888). "Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of
1941]
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Twenty-three years ago, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,29 the Su-
preme Court-with memorable dissent by Mr. Justice Holmes-
denied the right of Congress to exclude from the channels of
interstate commerce the products of child labor. A similar con-
gressional effort to regulate child labor, under the taxing power,
met a like fate at the hands of the Court 0 Attempts to adopt a
"child labor amendment" to the Constitution died still-born. It
seemed clear that there could be no federal regulation of child
labor.
In February, 1941, however, the Supreme Court upheld the
Wages and Hours Act. In a different day a different Court has
it ... ." United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12, 15 S.Ct. 249, 253, 39
L.Ed. 325, 329 (1895).
"If the possibility, or indeed, certainty of exportation of a product or
article from a State determines it to be in interstate commerce before the
commencement of its movement from the State, it would seem to follow that
It is in such commerce from the instant of its growth or production, and in
the case of coals, as they lie in the ground. The result would be curious. It
would nationalize all industries .... Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S.
245, 259, 43 S.Ct. 83, 86, 67 L.Ed. 237, 243 (1922).
See also Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584, 54 S.Ct. 541, 78
L.Ed. 1004 (1934); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 835, 80 L.Ed.
1160 (1936).
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837,
79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947 (1935), involved the corollary principle that, once
goods have come to rest within a state after having been in the "stream"
of interstate commerce, they are no longer subject to federal regulation.
29. 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649 (1918).
30. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 42 S.Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817
(1922). Similarly, in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed.
477, 102 A.L.R. 914 (1936), the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (48 Stat.
34, 35 (1934), 49 Stat. 770 (1935), 7 U.S.C.. §§ 608, 609, 623 (1939)) was held
unconstitutional because not a true tax. A true tax must be for a "public
purpose." See McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (1929) 18 Calif. L. Rev.
137, 241. Much federal regulation has, however, been accomplished under the
taxing power, e.g., the Federal Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 626 (1935),
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-503 (Supp. 1940). Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279, 109 A.L.R. 1293 (1937); (prohibitive tax on
narcotics) United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 39 S.Ct. 214, 63 L.Ed. 493
(1919); (tax on dealers of "gangster's" firearms under National Firearms
Act of 1934) 48 Stat. 1236 (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 2733 (1940), Sonzinsky v. United
States, 300 U.S. 506, 57 S.Ct. 554, 81 L.Ed. 772 (1937). Cf. Ribble, Conflicts
Between Federal Regulation Through Taxation and the States (1934) 23 Corn.
L. Q. 131. In effect, if the Court feels that a regulatory tax is desirable or
not desirable it will decide its constitutionality according to the following
formula:
Constitutional Unconstitutional
(1) Court will not examine the mo- (1) Court will examine the intention
tives of Congress. of Congress.
(2) Court will not look behind the (2) Court will look behind the mask
face of the statute. of the statute.
(3) The statute actually raises rev- (3) Revenue is merely incidental.
enue. Regulation is primary object.
(4) Statute has no criminal penalty (4) Statute has a penalty, which is
(or penalty is only to enforce a characteristic of regulations.
the tax).
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found constitutional fiat to sustain a statute accomplishing the
formerly reprobated objectives-and this in the face of the same
contrary arguments under the same Constitution. Thus-evolu-
tion without revolution.
In the Darby Lumber Company case-' a lumber manufacturer
was charged with operating, under substandard labor conditions
as to wages and hours, a business which involved the obtaining
of raw material and its conversion into lumber, with the intent of
shipping at least a part of the finished product across state lines.
It was also charged that the manufacturer did, in fact, send certain
of his finished goods into another state. The Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia sustained a demurrer
to the indictment on the ground that the statute was an unconsti-
utional attempt of the Federal Congress to control a purely intra-
state matter. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
this decision on appeal, holding, in sum, that labor conditions in
the manufacture of goods intended for interstate shipment have a
"substantial" effect upon interstate commerce; that, accordingly,
such conditions are a fit subject for congressional regulation. The
Court cited National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation32 and companion cases 83 in support of the prop-
osition that production may be commerce. In delimiting federal
regulatory authority, the settled criterion has long been whether
the effect upon interstate commerce of the activity sought to be
controlled was "direct," "intimate," "close," or "substantial" as
distinguished from "indirect," or "remote. 3 4 Silently ignoring the
test-words "direct," "intimate," and "close," the Court found that
31. United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 395
(1941).
32. 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352 (1937).
33. Supra note 13.
34. " . . . where federal control is sought to be exercised over activities
which separately considered are intrastate, it must appear that there is a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce in order to justify the
federal intervention .... To express this essential distinction, 'direct' has been
contrasted with 'indirect,' and what is 'remote' or 'distant' with what is
'close and substantial.' Whatever terminology is used, the criterion is neces-
sarily one of degree .. " Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 303 U.S. 453, 466-467, 58 S.Ct. 656, 660, 82 L.Ed. 954, 960
(1938).
11... there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct
and indirect effects [on interstate commerce]. The precise line can be drawn
only as individual cases arise, but the distinction is clear in principle .... If
the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions
which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the
federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people
and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by
sufferance of the federal government." A.L.A. Schechter Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 546, 55 S.Ct. 837, 850, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 1588, 97 A.L.R. 947, 966 (1935).
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the production of lumber had a "substantial" effect upon inter-
state commerce, and the die was cast.
Hammer v. Dagenhart" was overruled, eo nomine, the Court
stating that that decision stood alone and that
"The distinction on which the decision rested that Congres-
sional power to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to
articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleteri-
ous property-a distinction which was novel when made and
unsupported by any provision of the Constitution-has long
since been abandoned....
It should be and is now overruled .... "88
This was not a difficult decision. Congressional power to prohibit
the movement of goods in interstate commerce had already been
upheld in many cases, for example, as to (1) goods "unfit for
commerce," e.g., diseased cattle,8 7 impure food,88 misbranded
food;89 (2) goods the transportation of which is essential to the
accomplishment of an immoral activity, e.g., women for immoral
purposes, 0 prize fight pictures,41 lottery tickets;42 (3) goods the
transportation of which evades the laws of the state of origin, e.g.,
stolen motor vehicles, 8 kidnaped persons;"4 and (4) goods the
transportation of which evades the laws of the state of destina-
tion, e.g., intoxicating liquor 45 and convict-made goods."6 Further,
it has been frequently held that congress may wholly prohibit
intrastate activities which, if permitted, would result in restraint
of interstate commerce.4 7 The distinction between convict-made
35. 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed. 1101 (1918).
36. 61 S.Ct. 451, 458, 85 L.Ed. 395, 401-402 (1941).
37. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 23 S.Ct. 92, 47 L.Ed. 108 (1902).
38. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 31 S.Ct. 364, 55 L.Ed. 364
(1911).
39. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 33 S.Ct. 431, 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913).
40. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 33 S.Ct. 281, 57 L.Ed. 523 (1913);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917).
41. Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325, 36 S.Ct. 131, 60 L.Ed. 308 (1915).
42. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492 (1903).
43. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699 (1925).
44. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936).
45. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 37 S.Ct.
180, 61 L.Ed. 326 (1917).
46. Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 299 U.S. 334,
57 S.Ct. 277, 81 L.Ed. 270 (1937).
47. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 45 S.Ct. 551,
69 L.Ed. 963 (1925); Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 S.Ct. 396,
78 L.Ed. 804 (1934). Congress may regulate intrastate rates on interstate car-
riers where the effect of the rates is to burden interstate commerce [Hous-
ton E. & W. T. R.R. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341
(1914); United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70, 54 S.Ct. 28, 78 L.Ed. 181 (1933).
Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, 61 S.Ct. 580, 85 L.Ed. 531
(1941).]. It may prescribe maximum hours for employees engaged in intra-
[Vol. III
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goods as "bad" and child-made goods as "not bad" was specious. 8
It was easy for a Court so minded to add the exclusion of child-
made goods.
It could be argued with considerable merit that a rigidly uni-
form minimum wage might be a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment because "arbitrary. ' 49 In congressional hearings prior to the
passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, it was pointed out that
varying costs of living in different parts of the country would
render a wage, uniform in dollars and cents, quite non-uniform
when translated into terms of purchasing power.50 To meet this,
the act provides for classification of industries and classification
within industries, with accompanying flexibility of minimum
wage rates, in accordance with the recommendation of "industry
committees."51 In determining the wage rates in such classifica-
tions, the Administrator is to consider the following facts: "(1)
competitive conditions as affected by transportation, living and
production costs; (2) the wages established for work of like or
state activity connected with the movement of a railroad train, such as train
dispatchers and telegraphers [Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U.S. 612, 31 S.Ct. 621, 55 L.Ed. 878 (1911)]. It may compel the
adoption of safety appliances on rolling stock moving intrastate because of
the relation to and effect of such appliances upon interstate traffic moving
over the same railroad. Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 S.Ct. 2,
56 L.Ed. 72 (1911).
48. Compare this distinction with the treatment of regulatory taxes sug-
gested supra note 30.
49. " .... the guaranty of due process.., demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 54 S.Ct. 505, 510-511, 78 L.Ed. 940, 950
(1934).
50. "Such a wage rate, while uniform in amount, would be unequal and
discriminatory when translated into 'living wage.'" 83 Cong. Rec. 7301 (1938).
"The bill . . . totally ignores the fact that in a country as large as the United
States there are thousands of varying conditions to which this inflexible
proposal must be applied....
"We must also consider, from the standpoint of the employer. . . , the
cost of transportation. ...
"To impose a rigid inflexible wage in all parts of the United States will
unquestionably mean that some employers cannot longer compete in the east-
ern market where a majority of our consumers reside." 83 Cong. Rec. 7303
(1938).
The "child labor" provisions might also be attacked as arbitrary. ".... an
arbitrary wholesale prohibition of an entire business operation, only a part
of which was affected by the evil aimed at, where satisfactory results could
be achieved by more specific and less drastic regulatory measures constitutes
a deprivation of property without due process." Henry Root Stearn of the
New York Bar speaking of the "Barkley Bill" which, on this point, was like
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce on S. 592, S. 1976, S. 2068, S. 2226, S. 2345, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) 134.
51. Sections 5 and 8, 52 Stat. 1062, 1065 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. H 205, 208
(Supp. 1940).
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comparable character by collective labor agreements negotiated
between employers and employees by representatives of their
own choosing; and (3) the wages paid for work of like character
by employers who voluntarily maintain minimum-wage stand-
ards in the industry. . . . ,,5 As to classifications so made, the
Administrator is enjoined by the statute to fix for each classifica-
tion the highest minimum wage rate, not in excess of forty cents
an hour, which "(1) will not substantially curtail employment in
such classification and (2) will not give a competitive advantage
to any group in the industry.""8 Apparently, this flexibility satis-
fied the Supreme Court in the Darby Lumber Company case."
The question of "due process" was dismissed in a very brief para-
graph stating that, since the decision in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish,55 there was no doubt as to the existence of legislative
power to fix minimum wages; that the exercise of this power "is
not a denial of due process under the Fifth more than under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 5 6 It will be remembered that the
Parrish case involved a state statute. The Court did not dwell upon
this tacit assumption that there is a federal "police power, 5 7 but,
at another point in the opinion, it quoted from its language in
another recent decision, viz.,
"'The authority of the Federal Government over interstate
commerce does not differ in extent or character from that
retained by the states over intrastate commerce.' ,,18
Similarly, the Court, in citing cases supporting the maximum
hour provision, was forced to rely upon decisions involving state
statutes.59
The requirement of the law that records be kept by em-
ployers showing the hours worked each day and week by each
52. Section 8(c), 52 Stat. 1064 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 208 (Supp. 1940).
53. Ibid.
54. United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 395
(1941).
55. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703,
108 A.L.R. 1330 (1937), specifically overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital of
the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238
(1923), and upholding the Washington "Minimum Wages for Women" statute.
See Comment (1938) 11 So. Calif. L. Rev. 256.
56. 61 S.Ct. 451, 462, 85 L.Ed. 395, 406 (1941).
57. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934).
See Cushman, The National Police Power under the Constitution (1919) 3
Minn. L. Rev. 452.
58. 61 S.Ct. 451, 458, 85 L. Ed. 395, 401 (1941), quoting United States v.
Rock Royal Co-Op., 307 U.S. 533, 569, 59 S.Ct. 993, 1011, 83 L.Ed. 1446, 1468
(1939).
59. For example, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780
(1898); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 S.Ct. 435, 61 L.Ed. 830 (1917).
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employee 0 was upheld as "an appropriate means to a legitimate
end."
In the Opp Cotton Mills decision,6 2 handed down with the
Darby Lumber Company opinion, the Fair Labor Standards Act
successfully weathered the additional challenge that it involved
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Affirming
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court determined that the administrative procedure established
in the act for the determination of minimum wage orders for
classified industries does not constitute an unlawful delegation
of the legislative power of congress. The Court pointed out that
the function of the industry committees appointed by the Admin-
istrator is merely to investigate factual data, and to make recom-
mendations to the Administrator. Decisions based on that data
are made by the Administrator. Upholding the grant of discretion
to the Administrator, the Court stated clearly its position relative
to administrative officials and agencies:
"... the Constitution does not require that Congress should
find for itself every fact upon which it bases legislation....
In an increasingly complex society, Congress obviously could
not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the facts
subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined
legislative policy in fixing, for example, a tariff rate, a rail-
road rate or the rate of wages to be applied in particular
industries by a minimum wage law. The Constitution, viewed
as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to
be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the imprac-
ticable. The essentials of the legislative function are the de-
termination of the legislative policy and its formulation as
a rule of conduct. Those essentials are preserved when
Congress specifies the basic conclusions of fact upon ascer-
tainment of which, from relevant data by a designated ad-
ministrative agency, it ordains that its statutory command is
to be effective. 68
The Court noted that the act satisfies the requirements thus set
out in that it specifies certain factors which are to be considered
by the Administrator in making his determinations" and dis-
60. Sections 11(c) and 15(a)(5), 52 Stat. 1066, 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§
211, 215 (Supp. 1940).
61. 61 S.Ct. 451, 462, 85 L.Ed. 395, 406 (1941).
62. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 407 (1941).
63. 61 S.Ct. at 532, -8 L.Ed. at 416.
64. Section 8(c), 52 Stat. 1064 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 208 (Supp. 1940), quoted
in text at pp. 613-614, supra.
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countenanced the objections that these criteria were too vague.
Further, the Court stated, requirements of due process are satis-
fied by provisions for hearings before the Administrator "after
due notice to interested persons, '6 5 prior to his determination of
minimum wages within the various industry classifications. It
was objected by the Opp Cotton Mills that no opportunity for
"notice and hearings" before the fact-finding industry commit-
tees was provided. The court declared, however, that requirements
of due process do not demand a hearing at any particular point
in an administrative proceeding, but are satisfied where there is
ample opportunity for interested parties to be heard at some time
before the final order becomes effective. Thus this phase of the
Wages and Hours Act is fitted by the Court into the developing
structure of administrative law.
The "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938" has survived major
constitutional attacks from all sides. The Supreme Court has de-
clared that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce sub-
ject only to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution.6 It has
further stated in effect that the shipment across state lines of an
infinitesimal portion of the total output of a business may, under
the "commerce power," render every step in the chain of produc-
tion within the gamut of Congressional authority. 7 The govern-
mental history of the United States is the story of continuous
growth of federal authority at the expense of that of the several
states. Unless the position of the Supreme Court in the Darby
65. Section 8(d), 52 Stat. 1064 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. 208 (Supp. 1940).
66. United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 395
(1941).
67. The following language is found in the Darby Lumber Company case:
"Congress, to attain its objective in the suppression of nationwide competi-
tion in interstate commerce by goods produced under substandard labor con-
ditions, has made no distinction as to the volume or amount of shipments in
the commerce or of production for commerce by any particular shipper or
producer. It is recognized that in present day industry, competition by a
small part may affect the whole and that the total effect of the competition
of many small producers may be great." (61 S.Ct. at 461, 85 L.Ed. at 405.)
See H.R. Rep. 2182, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 7. Cf. National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 59 S.Ct. 668, 83 L.Ed. 1014 (1939).
As to the scope of acts included within the phrase "production for com-
merce," the Court said:
"Without attempting to define the precise limits of the phrase, we think
the acts alleged in the indictment are within the sweep of the statute. The
obvious purpose of the Act was not only to prevent the interstate transporta-
tion of the proscribed product, but to stop the initial step toward transpor-
tation, production with the purpose of so transporting it." (61 S.Ct. at 459, 85
L.Ed. at 402.)
See also Sections 7, 8, 15(a) (2), 52 Stat. 1062, 1063, 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 207, 208, 215 (Supp. 1940).
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Lumber Company case be subsequently modified, we are justified
in concluding that this migration of authority is practically com-
plete. Whatever else be the implications of this recent pronounce-
ment of our highest tribunal, it has certainly met the criticism
that the American constitutional system is too inflexible to oper-
ate in an evolving world.
WM. T. PEGUES*
BEN B. TAYLOR, JR*
DIVISIBILITY OF THE MINERAL SERVITUDE
The development of the concept of the mineral servitude in
Louisiana has given rise to the application of many legal doc-
trines and rules. Of all of these, perhaps the most controversial is
the doctrine announced in Sample v. Whitaker that the mineral
servitude is indivisible. Some writers felt very strongly that this
doctrine of indivisibility ought not be applied to the mineral ser-
vitude,2 and consequently most of the argument has been con-
cerned with this. However, any belief that the court would re-
verse itself was abandoned after a very recent decision, which
followed the doctrine to its logical extreme. With approval by the
court now clearly established, a re-examination and analysis of
the doctrine, and an inquiry as to how it should be applied, would
appear to be appropriate, for upon this doctrine rests a great deal
of the law of prescription as applied to the mineral servitude.
The first type of situation in which the doctrine of indivisi-
bility occurs is that in which a mineral servitude created on a
particular tract of land is acquired by A and B as co-owners. Does
the interruption or suspension of prescription on the servitude as
to A also interrupt or suspend it as to B? To this the Louisiana
Supreme Court gave an affirmative answer in Sample v. Whit-
aker. In so doing the court rejected the contention of the land-
owner that Article 5381 of the Civil Code, which states that a
* Member of the Louisiana Bar.
1. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
2. See Comment (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 246.
3. Ohio Oil Co. v. Cox, 198 So. 902 (La. 1940).
4. Art. 538, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Usufruct is divisible; for if this right
is vested in several persons at a time, there is but one usufruct, which is
divided among them, each having his portion. The reason is because the
object of this right is the receiving the fruits of the thing, which are corpo-
real and divisbie."
1941)
